Israel & Palestine, Life & Institutions, Middle Eastern, Political Science, Middle East, Military, International Relations 

The third volume of Nell Caplan’s comprehensive behind the scenes account of diplomacy in the Middle East focuses on attempts by the international community to bring about Arab-Israeli negotiations between 1948 and 1954. Using primary sources it reconstructs five efforts by the United Nations, the United States and Great Britain to move the antagonists in the conflict of 1947- 1949 from war to peace. These were: (a) Count Folke Bernadotte’s unsuccessful attempt to promote armistice negotiations: (b) the Egyptian- Israel armistice negotiations at Rhodes in 1949; (c) the 1949’ peace conference’ in Lausanne under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation commission for Palestine: (d) a second such conference in pairs in November 1951; and (e) unsuccessful attempt by the United Nation to promote direct negotiations from 1952-1954.
All of these attempts at diplomacy were ultimately unsuccessful –only the second resulted in the parties signing an agreement, and this was merely an armistice rather than a peace accord. Nevertheless, given the high degree of continuity in the basic position of the protagonists and in the kinds of opportunities that arise for contacts and diplomacy. Caplan’s study can teach us much about current negotiation in the Middle East and about the true dynamics of the Arab-Israel conflict.


 

These two volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez.The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources. - from Amzon 

Table Contents

1. Historical and Psychological Context....................................................P 1
1.1. Lessons from the Mandate Period
1.2. Changing Structure and Dynamics of the Post-1948 Conflict
1.3. Forms of Third-Party Intervention in the Arab-Israeli Dispute
1.4. The Maze of Mutual Perceptions and Misconceptions

2. War and Mediation, 1948 ................................................................P. 17
2.1. Bernadotte's 'Suggestions', 27 June 1948
2.2. Direct Negotiations
2.3. The Bernadotte Plan, September 1948: Acquiescence versus Agreement
2.4. Patterns and Precedents
3. Egypt and Israel at Rhodes................................................................P 34
3.1. United Nations Peacemaking: Two Tracks
3.2. From Truce to Armistice
3.3. Getting to the Table
3.4. Opening of Talks
3.5. Breakthrough: Signing the Armistice Agreement
3.6. From Armistice to Peace?
4. The Lausanne Conference: Prenegotiation...........................................P 57
4.1. The Palestine Conciliation Commission
4.2. Preparing the Ground
4.3. Shuttle Diplomacy
4.4. Quest for an Advance Gesture from Israel
4.5. PCC Beirut Conference, March 1949
4.6. Continuing Pressure for an Israeli Gesture
4.7. The Shadow of Rhodes
4.8. Strains in the Arab Common Front
5. Manoeuvring at Lausanne..............................................................P 76
5.1. Opening the Conference
5.2. A Basis for Discussion: The Lausanne Protocol, 12 May 1949
5.3. Staking out the Positions: The First Deadlock
5.4. Israel's Offer to Incorporate the Gaza Strip
6. Lausanne: The Final Stalemate...........................................................101
6.1. July Recess
6.2. Resumption of the Conference
6.3. Israel's Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Refugees
6.4. Continued Conciliation or Imposed Settlement?
6.5. Winding up the Conference 6.6. Lausanne Postcripts
7. Geneva Interlude.........................................................................127
7.1. Years of Drift
7.2. From Conciliation to Mediation?
7.3. Bilateral Negotiations
7.4. PCC Geneva Meetings, January-July 1950
8. Deterioration of the Armistice..........................................................P 145
8.1. From Negative Peace to Positive Peace?
8.2. Beginnings of the Arms Race
8.3. Regional Stability and Arms Control: The Tripartite Declaration, May 1950 8.4. The Entrenchment of Israeli and Arab Positions
8.5. Piecemeal Approaches: 'Knitting Tissue' over the Wound
9. PCC Paris Conference, Autumn 1951.....................................................P 162
9.1. From Atrophy to Activity: Ely Palmer, the State Department, and the PCC Initiative
9.2. Preparing the Conference
9.3. The Conference Begins
9.4. The PCC's Comprehensive Pattern of Proposal
10. The Paris Conference and the Demise of PCC Mediation.......................P 185
10.1. Draft Non-Aggression Formulae
10.2. From Preamble to Proposals
10.3. Paris Deadlock and the General Assembly
10.4. The Final Sessions: 14 November 1951
10.5. The Demise of the PCC and United Nations Mediation
11. The United Nations and Direct Negotiations, 1952-53.........................P 212
11.1. The Seventh General Assembly (1952): Eight-Power Draft Resolution 11.2. Changes during 1953: Qibiya and Israeli-Jordanian Tensions
11.3. The Israeli Call for Direct Negotiations: November 1953
12. The United Nations Conference that Never Was, 1953-54.......................P 230
12.1. Invoking Article XII: The First Stages
12.2. Arab Reactions to International Pressure
12.3. Responses to Jordan's Refusal Aftermath
13. Conclusion.......................................................................................P 257
13.1. Assessment of the Arab-Israeli Impasse
13.2. Approaches to Conflict Resolution
13.3. American Leverage on the Parties
13.4. Techniques of Conciliation
13.5. The Attitudes and Positions of the Parties
13.6. From War to War 14. Documents