These two volumes provide a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. Exploiting a range of available archive sources as well as extensive secondary sources, they provide an authoritative analysis of the positions and strategies which the principal parties and the would-be mediators adopted in the elusive search for a stable peace. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of each volume comprises both analytical-historical chapters and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.  

Table of Contents
Historical and psychological Context ...............................................P.1
War and Mediation, 1948 ..............................................................P. 17
Egypt and Israel at Rhodes ...........................................................P. 34
The Lausanne Conference - pre-negotiation ....................................P. 57
Manoeuvring at Lausanne ...........................................................P. 76
Lausanne - the final Stalemate ...................................................P. 101
Geneva Interlude .........................................................................P. 127
Deterioration of the Armistice .........................................................P.145
PCC Paris Conference, Autumn 1951 .............................................P. 162
The Paris Conference and the Demise of PCC Mediation ......................P. 185
The United Nations and Direct Negotiations, 1952-1953 ......................P. 212
The United Nations Conference that never was, 1953-54 ....................P. 230